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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

NICHOLE P. REDDISH,
Petitioner and Appellant,
v.

Appellate Court No,

SAMUEL RUSSELL,

20040027CA

Respondent and Appellee.

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF

Petitioner Nichole P. Reddish submits the following reply to
Respondent's brief:
ARGUMENT
POINT

I.

Appellees Point 1 is that Petitioner has failed to marshal
the evidence.

In particular, that Appellant has failed to

present "in a comprehensive and fastidious order' any fatal flaws
in the evidence which show that the decision of the trial court
is 'clearly erroneous".

Appellee then recites 9 paragraphs that

purport to illustrate that there were no fatal flaws in the
evidence.
Before addressing the nine arguments of Appellee, it must be
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noted that Appellee failed to dispute Appellant's Statement of
Facts.

Thus, they stand as alleged.

Second, Appellee failed to rebut, with anything but
generalizations, Appellant's evidence of Mr. Russell's other
children's needs, the quantified evidence of need of Marquel,
including chapter and verse marshaling of the Court's findings
juxtaposed with contrary evidence, or even the essence of the
trial and the brief, i.e., the particular needs of Marquel.
Appellees only response was a regurgitation of the lower court's
findings.
Appellant addresses the fatal flaws as follows.
Appellee recites the following findings the lower Court
made:
1.

"When the parties' combined income exceeds $10,000, the

child support is based upon the reasonable needs of the child".
(Findings of Fact No. 9, R-640).
This is indeed the law.

However, the flaw here is that

neither the Utah Court of Appeals nor the Utah Supreme Court
defines "the reasonable needs of the children".
are no statutes that provide a definition.

Further, there

Ms. Reddish indicated

in her brief how other jurisdictions resolved the virtually
identical issue of the reasonable needs of the child having some
bearing in the relative wealth of the parents, and that the trend
in defining "reasonable needs" in surrounding states and
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elsewhere reflected the trend that children are entitled to be
supported in a style and condition consonant with the wealth of
their parents.

This is especially noteworthy since the Appellee

cited Reinhart and Ball as Determinative Authorities, but neither
case defined what constituted the reasonable needs of the child
under the "appropriate and just" standard.

Indeed, the Court of

Appeals in Reinhart "...articulated the required

fact findings

for a just and appropriate award...in Ball v. Peterson" so it is
clear that the lower Court must enter fact findings for a just
and appropriate award, but the Court is left to its own means to
determine "just and appropriate".

x

Where clear and definitive

"badges" that might constitute reasonable needs are not set forth
by statute but nevertheless mandated by the Court, a look to the
national trend set by other jurisdictions is in order and should
be adopted by this Court.
McGinley v. Herman, 50 Cal.App.4f 936, (Cal. App. 1996),
<http://www.versuslaw.com>, at 29, cited In re Marriage of
Catalano (1988) 204 Cal App. 3d 543.

1

In Catalano, the mother

The dicta in the "not for official publication" case of Black v. Barney. 2000 Ut App 369,
the Court speaks of quantitative evidence such as a 'discussion of the children's specific expenses,
and cited, in footnote 1, that a trial exhibit that provided for an accurate accounting of the
children's pro rata share of the housing and utility costs were quantitative evidence. For
Appellant's Ms. Reddish's quantitative evidence, other than previously cited in pages 24 through
31; see also Trial Transcript 35,13-25; 36, 1-14; for Mr. Russell's children's expenses; Trial
Exhibit 14 (addendum exhibit 3), for a breakdown of Marquel's activities; Trial Exhibit 17,
Petitioner Ms. Reddish's Financial Declaration; Trial Exhibit 22, Summary of Expenses for
Activities; and Trial Exhibit 23, Canceled checks).
3

sought an increase in child support from $475 per month to
$2,000.

The father was wealthy, and, as in the case at bar, the

father owned two residences and had numerous automobiles.

The

court found that "a child's need for more than the bare
necessities...varies with the parents' circumstances...
Accordingly, where the supporting parent enjoys a lifestyle that
far exceeds that of the custodial parent, child support must to
some degree reflect the more opulent lifestyle even, though this
may, as a practical matter, produce a benefit for the custodial
parent." (Id, at p.552) "The Catalano court found that, under the
circumstances presented, ^the only tolerable award would be the
full $2,000 that [the mother] requested.

Anything less would

ignore the tremendous disparity between [the child's] lifestyle
and that of his father" (Id, at p. 556). The Utah Court of
Appeals, in a case that predated Reinhart, stated "Child support
awards should approximate actual need and, when possible, assure
the children a standard of living comparable to that which they
would have experienced if no divorce had occurred".

Ostler v.

Ostler, 789 P.2d 713, 716 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
The Appellant has provided quantitative evidence of the
reasonable needs of Marquel, both in the initial brief and in the
context of Black v. Barney.
2.

"Respondent's income is irrelevant".

No. 11; R-641).

4

(Findings of Fact

This "fatal flaw" is so fatal as to keep even Lazarus down.
"In cases

such as this, where the parties' monthly combined

adjusted gross income exceeds the highest level specified in the
statutory table, the court must decide whether there has been a
substantial change of circumstances warranting a modification of
a child support award based solely on an increase in the
obligor's income, which there enables him to provide greater
support.

See Harrison v. Harrison, 22 Utah 2d 180, 182," as

cited in Ball v. Peterson, 912 P.2d 1006,
<http://www,versuslaw.com>, at para. 71.

Ball continues, in the

same paragraph, "The district court found that Mr. Peterson's
monthly income

had increased from $10,500 to $14,583, an

increase of approximately 40%. Therefore, we do not

find that

the court exceeded the permitted range of its discretion in
concluding that a substantial change of circumstances occurred".
Not only did the lower court find that the Respondent's income is
irrelevant, but stated "I don't have a clue what was going on
back in 1999 when the present order was agreed to between the
parties.

So really I'm required to deny the petition on that

basis alone" (T.T. 147, 23-24, 148, 1-3, Findings of Fact para.
21).

This is another fatal flaw by the Court, since Trial

Exhibit 1 was Mr. Russell's 1999 income tax return, and clearly
showed his income for 1999, and Trial Exhibit 4, which was Mr.
Russell's 2000 income tax return, which showed his income for

5

2000. The 1999 income tax return

reflected substantial income

well in excess of the 1997 annual income of $126,589 (introduced
as Trial Exhibit 2 ) . Mr. Russell's income for 1999 was $375,191.
(Trial Exhibit 1, Appellant's Brief Addendum No. 6 ) . This was
also net income, just as Mr. Russell's income tax return of 2000
was net income, which net income was $440,823.

The difference

between net income of the 1997 income (utilized for the 1999
order) is the difference in percentage between $126,589 and
$440,823 which is approximately 300 percent.

Obviously, there is

a much greater difference than the 40% the Court of Appeals found
sufficient to warrant a material and substantial change of
circumstances in the Ball case.
3. "Respondent's income has not increased from $10,549.00
(granted by Order in 1999) to $448,023.00 annually (present)
because you just can't take Respondent ^s tax return and divide
the return by the number of months in a year.

Respondent is

responsible to pay taxes and there are also business expenses to
calculate, which are indicated in his return on the schedules.
Respondent's income has increased, but that increase standing by
itself has nothing to do to (sic) with whether or not there is a
difference in the child's needs from 1999 to the present''.
(Findings of Fact No. 16; R-641).
Unfortunately, the lower court was, well, dead wrong.
"fatal flaw" here is that even a cursory review of the 2000

6

The

income tax return (Trial Exhibit 4) shows his NET income, on line
22, to be $440,823.

The first page shows wages, etc., at

$60,497, taxable interest at $6,123, and $694 from Ordinary
dividends.

Subtracting capital gain or loss at -$3,000 (see

Schedule D for breakdown, that indicates the actual loss was
$5,068 but the maximum allowed by the tax code is $3,000, hence $3,000 on line 13) the next figure is $375,522 on Line 17.

Line

17 is made up of rental income, in this case rent from a
commercial building which on Schedule E shows that to be $76,076,
combined with Sub S and total partnership income on Schedule E,
Part II, line 31, is $299,446. This $299,446 is the net profit
after all of the expenses have been taken out.

Therefore, the

$299,446 plus the commercial rental income of $76,076 equals
$375,522, the figure on line 17 of Mr. Russell's first page of
his 2000 income tax return.
Frankly, it is elemental that the Individual Tax Return
(1040) is what is left after all expenses have been taken out.
That should not have been an issue at all with the lower court.2
4.

"The minor child in question is an eleven year old girl.

The Court has trouble believing that it is physically possible
for the minor child to participate in all the activities

2

It is well known that the primary reason people have Sub S corporations is to save on
payment of Social Security taxes and the medicare wage base. That would explain why Mr.
Russell only indicated a wage, which he himself determines, of $36,497 on his 1999 income tax
return, and $60,497 on his 2000 return.
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presented to the Court".
This is in

(Findings of Fact No. 17; R-642).

contradiction to Trial Exhibit 14, which listed

Marquel's activities, and the testimony of Marquel's mother and
Jeff Wolfe, and Mr. Wolfe's canceled checks illustrating payments
made for those activities, in Trial Exhibit 21.
5.

"The Court has difficulties with Petitioner's

credibility as to the expenses of the activities for the minor
child.

The Exhibits are not accurate.

There are no reasonable

explanations for how these expenses are being covered".
(Findings of Fact No. 18; R-642).
The judge at trial stated "I'm glad Mr. Wolfe is out there
apparently willing to cough up the funds to pay for those, if in
fact that's what's happening". (T.T. 145, 19-21).

Also, "I don't

know that she's paying more than she should for any of these
things.

I just know what Mr. Wolfe is paying on behalf of the

child", (T.T. 138, 12-14).

Other than the court's perception,

there was no evidence submitted by Respondent to counter the
testimony of Ms. Reddish or Mr. Wolfe.

There was no evidence to

counter the canceled checks of Mr. Wolfe, found at Trial Exhibits
21, nor any evidence presented to counter Exhibits 14, 17,20 or
22.
6.

"'$450 per month for extracurricular activities is not

reasonable".

(Findings of Fact No. 19; R-642).

Findings of Fact, para. 23 states,
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"The Court determined

that a better standard in regard to the reasonable needs of the
child should be something similar to what the Respondent is
paying for his other children.

The Respondent listed about

$500.00 per month per child in his answers to his interrogatories
which doesn't include housing or utilities'7.
Curiously, the trial judge ignored the private schooling
that Mr. Russell had enrolled his children in for two years prior
to the filing of the modification petition,

the testimony by Mr.

Russell that he and his wife "cut-back" the lavish Christmas's
they had previously been giving their children (at about the same
time the modification was filed), that child Taylor needs $200
per month for gymnastics, and didn't challenge the extremely low
average monthly costs of movies and entertainment at $5 per
month. (T.T. 35, 13-25; 36, 1-15; 36, 1-14, Trial Exhibit 6, pgs.
3 and 4 ) .
Even following the trial judge's prescription for a better
way of deducing reasonable needs for a child, it is clear that
Marquel fell well within that definition. $450 per month was not
unreasonable and is another fatal flaw in the lower court's
calculation.
7.

"Child support is not designed to insure that the minor

child lives in the same kind of house that Respondent's other
children live in.

This is not an alimony case".

Fact No. 20; R-642).

9

(Findings of

"Child support awards should approximate actual need and,
when possible, assure the children a standard of living
comparable to that which they would have experienced if no
divorce had occurred".
Ct. App. 1990).

Ostler v. Ostler, 789 p.2d 713, 716 (Utah

Although the parties never married, the logic is

the same.
8.

M

No evidence was presented to show that the reasonable

needs of the child had changed since the 1999 modification".
(Findings of

Fact No. 21; R-642).

This is begging the question.

The reasonable needs of the

child was not the criterion utilized by the Office of Recovery
Services in 1999.

They used the expediency of accepting

Respondent's income for 1997 for the 1999 order, since even his
1997 exceeded the maximum amount on the child support tables.
They did not look to the reasonable needs of Marquel and
therefore this issue was not addressed in the 1999 order.

They

further compounded the inequity by deducting his children in
current home from that income, which had the effect of reducing
his child support.

This would not have occurred had his real

income be used.
The evidence presented clearly illustrated that whatever
the reasonable needs were in 1999, they were not being met on
September 25, 2001, when the Petition to Modify was filed.
Further, there was an obvious material and substantial change of
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circumstances as indicated in Mr. Russell's gigantic increase of
income from the 1999 order (again, based on 1997 income) to his
income in 2001.

Finally, the implication of both Ball and

Reinhart are that "The increase in ability to pay must be
considered in light of the children's actual needs in fashioning
an "appropriate and just" child support award under section 7845-7(12)".

Reinhart v. Reinhart, 963 P.2d 757 (Utah App. 1998),

<http://www/versuslaw.com>,
9.

paragraph 23.

"The reasonable needs of the child are being met".

(Findings of Fact No. 22; R-642).
They are not.

Marquel needs to have subsidized school

lunches and would not have been able to participate in the extracurricular activities alluded to at trial were it not for the
friend of the family, Jeff Wolfe.

(See above, particularly

paragraphs 4 , 5 and 6 ) .
Additionally, in opposing counsel's closing, the court
queried about what the reasonable needs of the child were, as
follows:
THE COURT: Well, what are the reasonable, what is
reasonable?
listed there?

Is soccer, softball, piano, skiing, whatever else is
Why isn't that reasonable?

MR. DOPP: I think some of those things.
THE COURT: For this child.
MR. DOPP: I think some of those things are reasonable.

I

think soccer, piano, dance, Junior Jazz, softball, skiing, there
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are a lot of different levels of these activities.

There are a

lot of different teachers that you could maintain.

My wife took

violin lessons.

You could go to a person from the Utah Symphony

and pay a lot of money for violin lessons or you could go to
someone local.
THE COURT:

I don't know that she's paying more than she

should for any of these things.

I just know that Mr. Wolf is

paying on behalf of the child.
MR DOPP:

It seems to me that going to Hawaii for soccer is

a little bit more than your local AYSO type of soccer.
THE COURT:

I guess it depends on whether or not your child

is going to be world-class soccer player.
MR. DOPP:

That's correct.

My argument is that reasonable

needs of the children, needs we're talking about, would obviously
the shelter, clothing, food..
THE COURT:

No.

It means more than that.

This concludes the Appellees reference to the court's
Findings of Fact.

The Appellee next argues that the $448,823

amount is not the actual income of the Respondent, and cites the
Court's reasoning that dividing that amount by twelve months is
inaccurate because "... you've got to pay a few taxes on Four
Hundred and Forty-Thousand Dollars last time I checked with the
I.R.S. and that was last month." . (T.T. 144-145).

The court

went on to explain there were business expenses on a sub chapter
S, and that they were all right there in the schedules.
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Unfortunately, as explained in response to Finding No. 3 above,
this is "fatally" inaccurate.
POINT II
a.

The Respondent argues that the trial court did not err

in determining that there was not a material

and substantial

change of circumstances and that the Respondent's income was
correctly determined.
As can be seen in Finding No. 3 above, the Respondent's
income was incorrectly

determined.

However, Respondent then

submits that, even if there were errors, they were harmless and
thus non-prejudicial to Petitioner.
The error was critical to the trial court's perception of
the very issue that would or would not allow a finding of a
material and substantial change of circumstances.

If there were

no material and substantial change of circumstances, as the court
found, the pleading party is out of court.

That is exactly what

occurred when the trial court made the determination that
Respondent's income was irrelevant, as discussed in Finding 2.
b.

Respondent's next argument is that the Petitioner

failed to introduce evidence to establish the reasonable needs of
the child.

This has previously been responded to in the

preceding paragraphs.
c.

Respondent maintains, without supporting documentation,

that "The facts of each of the cases cited in Appellant's Brief
to support this argument [that there is a trend in other
13

jurisdictions that favor sharing the wealth of the parents with
the minor children] that is inaccurate because "each of the cases
...differ substantially from this case".

Respondent seeks to

distinguish the cases, apparently, because the Petitioner and the
Respondent were never married.
characteristics of these cases.

However, that is not the defining
What is uniform and consistent

is that it is the parents high income
not the marital status.

that drives the argument,

Petitioner's

response to Finding No. 1

above is incorporated herein for reference, and a review of the
McGinlev v. Herman and the In re Marriage of Catalano, for its
legal reasoning, is encouraged.

Also, In re the Marriage of

Cheriton, 92 Cal. App. 4th 269, a California Appeals Court
holding in 2001, found that "Child support may therefore
appropriately improve the stcindard of living of the custodial
household to improve the lives of the children" (para.30).

They

allude to their guidelines, but that special circumstances exist
that "include a parent's extraordinarily high income"(para. 31),
and cites, in para. 34, that a trial court was reversed for an
abuse of discretion when it failed to "give sufficient
consideration to the child's right to share in the standard of
living of his extraordinarily high earning father".

Indeed,

later on it cites the Fifth District Court of Appeals reversal of
a case, finding that "it did not permit the child 'to share in
her father's good fortune of having inherited a tremendous amount
of money and real property assets".
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(Para. 51, cited in County

of Kern v.

C a s t l e , 75 C a l . App. 4 th 1442).

Finally, Respondent argues that a careful reading of the
White case cited by Petitioner (White v. Marciano, 190 Cal. App.
1026, 1987) reveals that the California court actually took a
similar approach to Utah Courts, in that the child's needs must
be reasonable.

What the Respondent ignores, though, is that

these "needs" are more than just the basic necessities.

The

White case held, "Clearly, where the child has a wealthy parent,
that child is entitled to, and therefore 'needs' something more
than the bare necessities of life".

(Id, at 1032).

POINT III
Respondent argues that Appellant is not the prevailing party
and therefore attorney's fees should not be awarded to Appellant.
This is problematic unless this court reverses the lower
court's decision.
POINT IV
Respondent argues that because the parties agreed to share
medical and dental expenses that their agreement should not be
altered.
Respondent fails to acknowledge, first, the change of
circumstances from when this agreement was made.

When this

agreement was entered into, Mr. Russell had an income of $20,000
and Ms. Reddish was unemployed, attending school and receiving
State aid.

(R. 167-173; Findings of Fact, para. 5 , 7 and 13).

The order in 1999 was a mirror of the 1994 order with respect to
15

medical cost sharing; the only change was a child support
increase.3

The parties also agreed that both parties would

secure insurance if it became available to them (1994 Order,
para. 2; R. 174-179).
Second, although Respondent wants to insist on a strict
enforcement of an agreement made in 1994 and continued in 1999,
as to each party maintaining one-half of the medical costs, there
is no insistence on the corollary, i.e., that each would secure
insurance if it became available to them.

Mr. Russell, as his

own employer (T.T. 174-179), certainly had it within his control.
He never secured dental insurance on his daughter Marquel until
AFTER she had the need for braces.

He certainly, with his

$30,000 plus income per month, could easily handle one-half of
that additional expense.

Ms. Reddish could not easily handle it,

and the lower court made a fatal flaw when it did not consider
the enormous disparity between the income of the parties as to
this issue.

Ms. Reddish makes about 4% of Mr. Russell's income,

and, in fact, he paid more in charity contributions reported in
his 2000 income tax return than Ms. Reddish made ($19, 515 income
for Ms. Reddish, $31, 897 charitable contribution by Mr. Russell.
See Trial Exhibit 4, Schedule A, Itemized deductions, p. 34,

3

Although this agreement was by stipulation, it was not originated by Respondent Mr.
Russell. He paid nominal child support from 1994 through 1999 of $224, even when, in 1999, his
income was $375,191 (Trial Exhibit 1). He did not voluntarily increase his income, it came only
as the result of the Office of Recovery Services filing an action against him for higher child
support.
16

Appellant's Brief).

Petitioner introduced evidence as to this

disparity in income and the increased medical costs of Marquel,
in particular orthodontia costs, and the court ought to have
found a material and substantial change of circumstances on this
basis alone.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated in the Appellant's Brief and
Appellant's Reply Brief, the court should grant judgment in favor
of the Appellant.
DATED this 18th day of October, 2004.

MORRISON & MORRISON, L.C.

Grant W. P. Morrison
Attorney for Appellant
and Petitioner Nichole
P. Reddish
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